Walker Bank and Trust Company, Administrator of the Estates of Minnetta Walker, aka Netta Walker, Deceased, and Ila Minnetta Walker, Deceased, and John A. Walker, Deceased, and E. Walker, Roma Walker Grock and  Alta Fay Walker Lake and J.B. Walker v. Austin Walker : Brief of Appellant by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1965
Walker Bank and Trust Company, Administrator of
the Estates of Minnetta Walker, aka Netta Walker,
Deceased, and Ila Minnetta Walker, Deceased, and
John A. Walker, Deceased, and E. Walker, Roma
Walker Grock and Alta Fay Walker Lake and J.B.
Walker v. Austin Walker : Brief of Appellant
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Harold R. Boyer and Arthur H. Nielsen; Attorneys for Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Walker Bank v. Walker, No. 10374 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3640
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALKER BANK AND TRUST ,, -
COMP ANY, a corporation, AdmJ'i-
istrator of the Estates of MIN-
NETTA WALKER, aka Nettie 
Walker, deceased, and ILA MIN-
i i .r:: 0 
1·· ,; 1 u l9bS 
~ E T T A WALKER, deceasoo,C:.,. ,. . . 
JOHN A. 'V ALKER, deceased, , '~"'"m" c,,~rl. ~;,;;;·--
and R. E. WALKER, ROMA j 
WALKER GROCK and ALTA Case No. 
FAY WALKER LAKE, 1037 4 
Pkiintiff s and Respondents, 
and 
J.B. WALKER, 
Involuntary Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
AUSTIN WALKER, 
Defendant and Appellant. J 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Judgment of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County 
HAROLD R. BOYER 
of Romney & Boyer 
Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
Newhouse Building 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
Clyde, Mecham & Pratt 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appelltm.t 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and 
THOMAS C. CUTHBERT 
Attorneys for Respondents 
• 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ..... ···········-·····-··--·----·-·--·-················· 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.................................. 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL...................................................... 2 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................. 3 
ARGllMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS NO CONFIDENTIAL RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND HIS MOTH-
ER: AND THE DEEDS WERE NOT PROCURED 
BY UNDUE INFLUENCE UPON HER................................ 8 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING ON THE 
"DEAD MAN'S STATUTE" PRECLUDING DE-
FENDANT AND HIS WIFE FROM TESTIFYING 
WITH RESPECT TO MATTERS PERTAINING TO 
UNDUE INFLUENCE ................................................................ 20 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A CON-
FIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFEND-
ANT AND HIS SISTER ILA AND IN DENYING 
COMPENSATION TO DEFENDANT FOR HIS 
SERVICES AS TRUSTEE ........................................................ 21 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT 
ALTERNATIVE RELIEF BY WAY OF A LIEN ON 
THE PROPERTY ACQUIRED FROM HIS MOTHER 
FOR IMPROVEMENTS AND TAXES PAID.................... 22 
POIKT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.................................................. 24 
CONCLUSION 28 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases 
Amando v. Aguirre, 63 Ariz. 213, 161 P. 2d. 117.............................. 11 
Anderson v. Thomas. 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142.......................... 12 
Binder v. Binder, 50 U. 2d 142, 309 P. 2d 1050................................ 12 
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 401 P. 2d 710 (Utah) ................................ 14, 15 
Burk v. Peter. 115 Utah 58, 202 P. 2d 543........................................ 20 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - (Continued) 
Chadd v. Moser, 25 Utah 369, 71 P. 870 .............. . 
····-······-····· 
Commercial Bank v. Page & Brinton, 45 Utah 14 
142 P. 709 ............................................................. '. ........... . 
Desert Centers, Inc. v. Glen Canyon, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 166 
356 p. 2d 286 ......................................................................... : ....... . 
Froyd v. Barnhurst, 83 Utah 271, 28 P. 2d 135 .............. . 
•••••••••••n•••• 
Furlong v. Tilley, 51 Utah 617, 172 P. 676 ....................................... . 
Gibbons v. Brimm, 119 Utah 621, 230 P. 2d 983 .................... . 
Glenn v. Player, 7 Utah 2d 428, 326 P. 2d 717 ............................... . 
Hancock v. Luke, 52 Utah 142, 173 P. 137 ....................................... . 
Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 P. 433 ...................................... . 
In re LaVelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253, 248 P. 2d 372, 378 ............... . 
Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 708 ........................... . 
Randall v. Tracy-Collins Trust Company, 6 Utah 2d 18, 
305 P. 2d 480 ................................................................................... . 
Re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602... ........... ·-······-··········· 
Richmond v. Ballard, 7 Utah 2d 341, 325 P. 2d 839 ................... _. __ 
Rosenthyne v. Matthew-McCullough, 51 Utah 38, 168 P. 957 ..... . 
Salvner v. Salvner, 349 Mich. 375, 84 N.W. 2d 871.. ..................... . 
Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834 ...................... ·-··· 
State v. Duncan, lO'l Utah 449, 132 P. 2d 121 ................................... . 
Stringfellow v. Hanson, 25 Utah 480, 71 P. 1052 ........................... . 
Universal Investment Co. v. Carpets, Incorporated, 
400 P. 2d 564, 567 (Utah) ........................................................... . 
Statutes 
Sec. 78-24-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953 ........................................... . 
Page 
12 
19 
10 
11 
18 
23 
23 
10 
12 
26 
18 
14 
12 
23 
11 
20 
26 
12 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\L-\.LKETI BA~K AND TRUST 
CO.JIPAXY, a corporation, Admin-
istrator of the Estates of MIN-
XETTA \YALKER, aka Nettie 
Walker, deceased, and ILA MIN-
~ E T T A \\' ALKER, deceased, 
.JOH~ .:\. WALKER, deceased, 
and R. K \VALKER, ROMA 
\\'ALKER GROCK and ALTA 
FAY \\' ALKER LAKE, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
and 
J. B. \V ALKER, 
Involuntary Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
.\D-lTIX WALKER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10374 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by \Valker Bank and Trust Com-
pany al'i Administrator of the Estates of Minnetta Walker 
and Ila .Jiinnetta \Valker and others against Austin 
Walker, Appellant herein, seeking to have certain con-
wyances of real property made to Appellant by Min-
1 
------1111 
netta \ValkPr (l\lother of Appellant) and Ila 'I' 
. ~1 Innetta 
\Valker (Sister of Ap1wllant) set asi<lP and 
1
., . 
. ,•q nesting 
the Court to vest the h•gal t1tlPs therPin in Plaint'f'f, · 
I ~ a~ 
their interPsts may appear. Appt>llant ass<>rtPd that as 
to the pro1wrty d(:'ed(•d to him from his motli"r h, . ' ~ wa.~ 
the own(:'r tht>reof but that in the altPrnatiw if the Court 
adjudged Appellant was not the ownpr hP wal' entitlPrl 
to a lien t11(:'reon for his serviees and cost:-; ('Xpended 1 ~ 
connection with the property and his motlwr ov .... r th~ 
years. As to the property d<•(•d(:>d from his sistPr Appel-
lant clai1m·d that he had rect>ived the propPrty in trmt 
for certain specific purposPs which had been fulfillPd. 
DISPOSITION IX THE LO\rER COL"RT 
The matter \\·as tried to the Court without a jur:-. 
following which the Court entered judgmPnt divesting 
Appellant of title to any of the property transferred to 
him by his mother or sish1 r and requiring him to account 
for and turn over to \ValkPr Bank & Trust Company aU 
such property, real or personal, as he may haYC receiwd 
from his sister, including any interest dividends or other 
returns thereon, provided Appellant should have a lien 
on any property received from his sister for expenditures 
made by him for which the Court shall det(:'rmine he is 
entitled to reimbursement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This being an equitable proceeding, Appellant seeks 
by this Appeal to have the SuprPme Court review t~e 
evidence and determine that the trial court erred in 
2 
holding that a confidential relationship existed between 
.-\ppellant and his mother and that Appellant exercised 
nJl(ltw in fhwn('\' upon his mother in connection with the 
i·xi·cntion arnl dPliwry by her of the Deeds on the prop-
t·r1Y ill qU\·stion. Ap1wllant further contends that the 
rrial <·ourt nrPd in rpfusing to allow Appellant or his 
\nf1· to tt·stify "·ith r!'s1wct to any claimed undue influ-
eJH'\'. l 11 th1· alt\•rnatw Appellant claims that he should 
),.. Pnt it l1·d to hP reimbursed for the monies expended by 
liin1. l'nr tax<'s and other costs incident to operation of 
1 lw 11ro1H'rt~· and for hi:; services rendered thereon and 
fnr hi;-; n1otl11·r, for which he is entitled to a lien on the 
pr111wrt~·. 
\Yith rPsJJed to the property acquired from his 
sistPr thP Lower Court <>rred in holding there was a con-
fidential rP!ationship between the parties since Appel-
lant l1a;-; alway;; eonePdPd that hf> received such property 
in trust for C\Ttain purposes which are undispute~ by 
t!1t· partiPs an<l in eonnection there>vith the Court should 
liaw permittPd him to make an accounting in which he 
would l'P('PiYP ('rPdit for his costs and expenses incurred 
as \\·ell as reasonahlP compensation for his services. 
Finally, Ap1wllant contends that the trial court erred 
in n•fnsing to grant Appellant a new trial on the ground 
,,f 11\'\\·]~· discovPrPd f>vidence. 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
At the time of the pretrial this case and a compan-
1011 case in which the plaintiffs are the same as here 
3 
and J. B. \Valker is named as defendant being . ' case no. 
139,265 recently decided on appeal bv this cou t 
. . · r ' Wer. 
consolidated for trial (R. 15(a) ). Even though .· . consoh. 
dated, the eVIdence was heard separately in each case 
The J. B. Walker case was tried first; and thereafte, 
at the trial of the instant matter and evidence in tha: 
case insofar as applicable was deemed evidence in thi~ 
case. References to the transcript in the J. B. Walker 
case will be by page number following the designation 
"JB\V." Reference to the transcript in this case will \ii: 
by page number following the designation ''R." 
Plaintiffs seek to have the court set aside two deedi 
obtained by the defendant from his mother upon the 
ground of incompetency of the grantor (Tr. 16a). The; 
also seek relief with respect to transfers to defendant 
of property from his sister Ila. 
The defendant Austin \Valker is the youngest son of 
John A. and :Minnetta Walker. He has two brothers, J. 
B. \Valker and R. E. \V alker, who are the two eldest chil-
dren of the family. There were three sisters, Faye, Ila 
and Roma ( JBW 210, 211). The father died in 1912 
(JB\V 211); Ila died on February 23, 1955 (R. 114): 
the mother died in November 1959 (R. 115). The family 
grew up on a farm of approximately 40 acres in the 
vicinity of Union in Salt Lake County, Utah (JBW 2121 
J.B.,- R. E., and Faye were married in the 1920s. R. E. 
• . 'fe 
moved away when he got married; J. B. and his Wl 
remained in the home until 1931 when they moved away 
(JBW 211, 212). Faye and her husband moved to Ne· 
vada · Ila never married. She lived in the family home 
' 
4 
all of hPr life until 1952 ( R. 145). Roma lived in the 
family home f'XC'Ppt for periods when she worked in 
California and X evada. She returned to the family home 
in 19;"i-t an<l has been there ever since. (R. 249). Minnetta 
\\'alhr, the mother, lived in the family home until her 
dPath. l'Xt:PJ>t for a year in 1952 and 1953 when she 
; 1 as with Faye in ~evada (R. 352). Austin married in 
19:r~ ( R 1-t2) and t•ver since then, except for two or 
thrP(' years, has lived with his family within approxi-
matPly a block of the family home (R. 450). 
Prior to 1920, J. B. and R. E. engaged in the truck-
ing business and from then on did no farming (R. 143). 
From approximately 1920 until the present time Austin 
had practically the sole responsibility for the operation 
of the farm (R. 1-!2). There were two or three years 
when his mother rented the farm but the lessees failed 
to 1wrforrn and it became Austin's responsibility to sal-
YagP as much of the crop as possible (R. 289). 
l~ntil approximately 1947 there were horses and 
cows on the farm and chickens at various times (R. 418). 
~lo:,;t of the crops produced on the place were used to 
f Ped tlw livestock and were used by the family (R. 288). 
Prior to about 19~0, the family operated a mercantile 
~tore. However the store was closed in the early 1920s 
( JBW :.239) and thereafter the only source of income of 
.\!other Walker was from the sale of dairy and poultry 
products ( R. 230) produced on the farm. 
The farm consisted of three tracts of land - viz., a 
tract of approximately 11 acres shown in pink on Ex-
5 
hi bit 3; a tract shown in orange on Exhibit 3 con.- ,t· SI~ illg 
of approximately 19 acrt•s; and a tract known as ti 
" k " b It cree property ut not shown on Exhibit 3 con~· ,t· 
' clS ill·• 
of approximately 10 acres. In addition there are tli: 
lots shown on Exhibit 3 East of the pink tract wheri: 
the \Y alker home, outbuildings and store \\'PrP located. 
On Octobt>r 8, 195-1, :\linnetta \Yalhr, the muther. 
executed and dt>liven•d to Austin two dPeds which arf 
Exhibits P-4 and P-G. Exhibit P--1 descrilws the prr
11
, 
erty known as the "creek prorwrty"; Exhibit P-6 d~­
scribes the property shown in pink. These deeds were 
executed by Austin's mother at a bank in Midvale, rtaL 
in the presence of Dale \V aters, Vice President and jfan. 
ager of the bank, who then and there notarized her sig. 
nature ( R. 317, 318). At the time of the execution of said 
deeds she remarked, in his presence, that she was glad 
she could do this in return for what Austin had done 
for her and that Austin had more than paid for the 
property (R. 400, 40G). From the time of their execu-
tion until they were recorded on November 25, 193~1. 
said deeds were in the possession and control of _\ustin 
(R. 398). 
In the late 1930s a compromise for delirn1uent taxei 
on the \Valkt>r property for several prior years W(J.I 
effected for the sum of $844.44 (JB\V 300). Austin paid 
this sum bv his check dated December 26, 1939, Exhibit 
49 in Case. 139,265 (R. 407, 408). Austin also paid ta:M 
o; the \V alker property for the yt>ars 1925, 1926, 192!1 
and 1931 totallinO" $438.12. Exhibit D-11. Austin alio 
' b ~ 
paid taxes on the vValker property for the years 1 
· ·b· Dl9 All to 1962 inclusive totallmg $3,320.07, Exh1 it - •· 
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ta'.\PS ahon mmtioned were paid with funds of Austin 
t''.\('Ppt during- the 1930s Austin's mother gave him money 
to pa.\ taxi's for th l'<'e or four years ( R. 444). Taxes on 
t!H· trad slimrn in pink and the "creek property" which 
,, ('/'(' (·om·p:-Pd to Austin by his mother are included 
ill the amo1111ts paid for the years above set forth (R. 
-W7). :\ ust m had exclusive possession of the property 
acquired from his mother from the year 1947 until the 
Jll't'H'nt tilllP. (R. 4:21). 
1 n DPc<•mher 195-t-, Ila Walker, a sister of Austin, 
\ms in a hospital at which time she caused her property 
to lw transft·rn·d to Austin (R. 321). Included in the 
prorwrty so transferred was a 3 acre tract, shown on 
Exhibit ;3 as the property in brown, which was trans-
f Prred hy quit claim deed, being Exhibit P-5. Appellant 
Jia" ahrnys agret'd that he received the property from 
Ila for the purpose of paying her debts and funeral ex-
pPnsPs and for paying for the support and maintenance 
of h;s 1110thPr until her death and then for her expenses 
of last illnPss and funeral expenses (R. 427). He offered 
at t!te timf' of thP trial to account for the property re-
e1·iHd from Ila: hut the court refused to permit him 
to do so ( H. -t:~7). 
The trial court found there was a confidential rela-
tionship lwtwt'en defendant and his mother and also be-
hrP<>n dt'frndant and his sister Ila (R. 47, 48). The trial 
court ht>ld thP dt'eds from defendant's mother to be null 
and void on the ground of undue influence exercised by 
the dt'frndant upon her (R. 47). The court ordered de-
fendant to a('count for all the property transferred to 
7 
him from his sister Ila and, except such as the eou 
"shall determine he is entitled to by way of reiinburs~ 
ment out of the assets of the trust," ordered him t d 
0 ~­
liver the same to the administrator of the estate of hi~ 
sister (R. 44). ' 
The defendant claims the deeds from his mother arP 
valid or, in the alternative if he is deprived of the prop-
erty, that he should be entitled to a lien thereon for the 
amount of taxes paid, improvements made and service~ 
rendered (R. 6, 7). Defendant acknowledged the trust 
with respect to the Ila property and offered to account 
for the same as stated above, and claimed compensation 
for his services as trustee ( R. 19). Appeal is taken from 
the orders of the trial court denying defendant any of 
the relief claimed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO CONFIDENTIAL RELA-
·TIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND 
HIS MOTHER; AND THE DEEDS WERE 
NOT PROCURED BY UNDUE INFLUENCE 
UPON HER. 
The Court made a finding that a confidential rela-
tionship existed between Appellant and his mother and 
that the Deeds were procured by Appellant by the ex· 
ercise of undue influence upon her but did not find any 
facts upon which the confidential relationship would 
rest. However, undue influence was not an issue in the 
case. The Pre-trial Order lists the contentions of the 
Respondents as follows: 
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( 1) Defendant acquired certain property from his 
:-istrr on an exprPss trust (R-16). (This was always the 
Jlo:-;ition taken hy Defendant.) 
( 2) If the property was not taken on an express 
tru:-;t. the transft->r to Defendant from his sister was 
\(lidablP lweaust-> of "the incompetency of Ila Walker at 
tl!P ti11H-' of the execution of the instruments by which 
t!w rnrious transfers were effected." (R-16A) 
\ ::! ) Tlw transfers of certain properties to Defend-
an: from his mother "are void by reason of the incom-
pPtf::'ncy of the grantor." (R-16A) 
( -1-) Def Pndan t has admitted and declared he "held 
tl10sr propPrtiPs acquired from his mother in trust for 
thl' Plaintiffa and generally for the heirs of Minnetta 
\falkPr." (R-16A.) 
Xor did the Pre-trial Order frame an issue as to any 
"confidential'' relationship between Appellant and his 
1nother or sister. 
At tlw lwg'inning of the trial, Counsel for Respond-
ents in his opening statement made the following refer-
Pnce concerning qndue influence and confidetial relation-
ship: 
"It will further be our contention that if 
Minnetta Walker was technically competent at 
the time she executed these instruments, she nev-
rrthf'less did so under undue influence from the 
defendant, Austin ·walker. Our evidence of un-
due influence will be simply the close family tie 
between the defendant and the donor, the fact 
that he lived in such close proximity to her, that 
he saw her quite frequently. His chicken coop 
was right next to her house. I say he saw her 
9 
f!·eqlH'_ntly; and if ~hPrP was a ('<>nfidential rP]a. 
t10nslup lwtwPPn tl11s rnotlu•r and any of he . . l . . r ~on, 
1t wa:::; wtwePn ~Lmndta and the def<·ndant.'' ·· 
This :::;tatPment explain:::; why tlw n•(·ord allJ>ea . r~ ttJ 
be totallY lacking in <·ither anv PvidPnee of a eonf'i"d · · · f·nt1a1 relatiom~hip behn.•en Defondant his motlwr or of am 
facts indieating the exerci~H.• of unduP inflm•nce upon h\'.r 
by Defendant. 
Although Respond<1 nts admitted at the outset tha: 
their claim of undue influence rests upon tht' "c·lo~P 
family tie betwePn the dPfon<lant and the donor," the 
law is well settlPd that family relationship alone is n11t 
sufficient to establish "confidt>ntial relationship'' or "u..~­
due influence." In Hatch v. llatch, -!-() U.218, 1-18 P. -±33, 
where the Court was concPrne<l with a convenyance from 
a father to his son, the Court held: 
"In nearly all, if not all, of the foregoing 
cases (excepting those cited from L'tah) the 11uP~· 
tion of what constitutes a fiduciary relation or 
one of such trust and confidence as ordinarily will 
cast the burden of proof on the beneficiary of a 
particular transaction is fully discussed. It ts 
made very clear that under circumstances !ikP 
those in the case at bar there is no such fiduciary 
relation of trust and confidence as will cast the 
burden of proof upon the beneficiary under a deed 
or a will. The relation of parent and child or hu"· 
band and wife does not, in and of itsflf, create 
any such presumption." (Emphasis added) 
Again, in the case of Froyd 1/. Barnhurst, 83 C 2il, 
28 P. 2d. 135, the Court made the following comments. 
"Appellants apparently place the burden of 
their argument upon the proposition that then: 
10 
"a~ a l'onfidrntial relationship existing between 
,\,ot'endant and IH•r lllother, ~lrs. 8andin, and 
th•·n·fon· this ease is controlled by the rule that 
\\ lwn• slwh eonfidPntial relationship exists be: 
t\\t>1•n g-rantor and grantee, the burden is upon 
thl' .~rantee to show the transaction to be fair 
and f n·e from fraud and undue influence. Appel-
lant ('it1·s Peter:-;on v. Bitdge, 35 Utah 596, 102 P. 
:21 l; JJirdsl'll I'. Leai:itt, 32 Ctah 136, 89 P. 397; 
/'uf1111d 1·. Corl'.IJ, () l'tah 3~2, 2-1 P. 190; Omega. 
f 11 r1sf11/l'lif Co. L Woolley, '72 Utah -17-1, 271 P. 
l!ll; also Paddock r. Pulsifer, -13 Kan. 718, 23 P. 
104-!)' 1051. 
.. J)pf t'ndants do not complain of the rule 
stat('d and follow1:1d in these cases, but contend 
tl1<·,· han· no application to the case at bar. In 
0!11.,,r words, tlwy contend the facts here do not 
1m·s1·11t a <'USI:' of fiduciary or confidential rela-
tionship. Here the claim of fiduciary relation-
ship is based upon the following evidence in addi-
tion to the fact of the parties being mother and 
dau1-d1tc>r: The mother was old and feeble, could 
iwt read or write the English language; she lived 
with the daughter, who at one time tried to collect 
a note belonging to her mother without success. 
For a time they had the mother's money in a 
joint ha11k account in the name of both the mother 
and daughter, a11d the daughter at times col-
lected the rent due to her mother. 
"This court is committed to the doctrine that 
tlie mer<' relationship of parent and child does not 
co 11 sf it11 t e evidence of such confidential relation-
sl1 i pas to create a prPsnmption of fraud or wndue 
i11tfocncl'. Hatch r. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 P. 
-1-:33, -137; Furlong V. Tilley, 51 utah 617, 172 P. 
fil(i." (Emphasis added) 
~!'\, al~o, F11rlo11.fJ I.'. Tilley, 51 e. 617, 172 P. 676; Amado 
r .• lt;11irn" !i:l Ariz. :213, lGl P. 2d. 117; Salvner v. Salv-
11 
ner, 349 Mich. 375, 8-! N.,V. 2d 871, Binder i:. Bindit 
50 U. 2d 142, 309 P. 2d 1050. 
This Court has been required on several occasion, 
to reverse the trial court on the matter of undue influence 
See, Chadd v. Moser, 25 U. 369, 71 P. 870; Stringfell-Ou 
v. Hanson, 25 U. 480, 71 P. 1052; In re Lavelle's Esfot'. 
122 U. 253, 248 P. 2d 372; Richmond v. Ballard, 7 Cle 
341, 325 P. 2d 839. 
In the Richmond Case this Court quoted \11\L 
approval form the earlier case of Anderson 1.:. Thomn.' 
108 U. 252, 159 P. 2d 142. There the evidence relied on 
by the Plaintiff to set aside the conveyance included th" 
following facts: 
" ( 1) The transfer to the Defendant son was 
without consideration (other than love and affec-
tion); 
(2) The Grantor (mother) was 86 years old: 
( 3) She was failing in health and almost 
totally blind ; 
( 4) At time of the transfer she was grieving 
over the loss of another son; 
( 5) Court found that, under the ~irc~­
stances, the Grantor could have been easily !Ill· 
posed upon; 
( 6) The Grantee (son) lived in same home 
with the Gran tor; 
(7) The Grantee received "substantially all' 
of Grantor's property a few months before Gran-
tor's death; 
( 8) The tr an sf er to Grantee in effect disin· 
herited six other children; 
12 
''This Court, in an opinion by Justice Wolfe 
affi.rmed the . D~strict Court's decision refusin~ 
to fmd undue mfluence on the above facts, stating: 
'However, these circumstances alone are 
not sufficient to show undue influence. The 
Plaintiff must do more than merely raise a 
suspicion. There must be some affirmative 
evidence to show that Richard did exercise 
a dominating influence over this mother and 
thm; induced her to part with her property. 
Such affirmative evidence is almost totally 
lacking here.' 
"The Court observed that 'no one testified 
to anything that would indicate that Richard was 
bringing pressure to bear on his mother to effect 
the transfer of this property to him.' " 
~\. finding of undue influence cannot rest upon mere 
suspicion, nor will it be presumed from mere interest 
or opportunity. 
"\\'e are aware that ••••undue influence is sel-
dom suhjeet to direct proof, but, as a general 
rule, must be established by inferences and cir-
cumstancps •••';but it must also be kept in mind 
that ... "'it likewise is true that a finding of undue 
influence cannot rest upon more suspicion. There 
must be some substantial facts upon which the 
inferences and deductions are based, and the cir-
eumstanees reli<>d on should clearly point out 
tlu-- 1wrson who it is alleged exercised the undue 
influencl• and his acts constituting the alleged 
undue influence." (Emphasis added.) In re La-
y elh.>'s Estate, 122 Utah 253, 248 P. 2d 372, 378. 
"•••undue influence must be proved. It will 
1wt be presumed from mere interest or opportun-
ity. The opportunity to exercise influence, unless 
romlJined u·ith circumstances ten.ding to show its 
exercise a/fords no presumption that it was in 
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f ?.ct exercised." ( E~rnphasis added.) He Brv ', 
Estate 82 l 1 tah 390, 25 P. :2d (ilO. .an" 
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, .... U. 2nd .... , 401P.2d ilO · 
• lb 
the most recent case of which we are aware in which 
this Court has discussed confidential rPlationship and 
undue influence. In that case the Court reversed thf 
trial court and found there was not a confidential rela-
tionship and that a finding of undue inflm•nee could 
not be sustained. In discm;sing th<-,se qut>stion~, tlw 
Court stated on page 713 of 401 Pacific 2nd: 
"The first question to be resolved is whether 
the lower court erred in its determination that 
a confidential relationship existed between the 
parties as that term is considered in its legal 
significance. The evidence is undisputed that 
there existed anwng the parties sincere aff ectio11, 
trust and confidence, but is that legally sufficient 
to constitute a confidential relationship giving 
rise to a presumption that the transaction 1i·a" 
unfair? We think not. 
"The mere relationship of parent and child 
does not constitute evidence of such confidential 
relationship as to create a presumption of fraud 
or undue influence. While kinship may be a factor 
in determining the existence of a legally signif-
icant confidential relationship, there must be a 
showing in addition to the kinship, a reposal of 
confidence by one party and the resulting super-
iority and influence on the other party. T~e 
relationship must be such as would lead an ordi~­
arily prudent person in the management of his 
busmess affairs to repose that degree of con-
fidence in the other party which largely results 
in the substitution of the will of the latter t,or 
that of the former in the material ~iatters '"" 
valved in the transaction. The doctrme of con· 
14 
fidential relationship rests upon the principle of 
iuequality between the parties, and implies a posi-
tion of superiority occupied by one of the parties 
owr the other. Mere confidence in one person 
/Ji/ n11othrr is not sufficient alone to constitute 
s11cli n relationship. The confidence must be re-
posed by one under such circumstances as to 
cr<'ate a corresponding duty, either legal or moral, 
upon the vart of the other to observe the con-
/idcnce, and it must result in a situation where 
~'" a matter of fact there is superior influence on 
11111' side and dependence on the other." (emphasis 
ours) 
ThP tonrt, in Bradbury vs. Rasmussen, supra, also 
h\'ld that undue influence must be proved by clear and 
1·om'mcmg evidPncP. TlH' record in the instant case 
is lacking in proof of undue influence by clear and 
convincing evidence. lnfact, it is wholly devoid of any 
t>vi<lPn('P of undue influence. It is not even susceptible 
of a snspieion of undue influence. At most, Respondents 
han~ done no more than show an opportunity. This is 
not enough. 
Although handicapped by the court's ruling on the 
applitation of the ''dead man's statute," defendant's evi-
dPnee is elPar and positive and refutes even a suggestion 
of undue influence. The execution of the deeds by Mother 
\\' alker was not a ''bedroom" transaction nor a "death 
bed" episode. The deeds were executed more than four 
years prior to her death in a bank in Midvale, Utah, 
before a vice president and manager of the bank and 
were notarized by him (R. 317). Although Mr. Waters, 
the bank officer, could not remember the conversation, 
he remembered the incident and testified there was noth-
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ing unusual about the transaction that attracted his 
attention (R. 318). Had defendant attempted to impose 
his will upon his mother to such an extent as to result 
in the substitution of his will for hers, it is quite unlikeh· 
that such would have escaped the observation of ~1;. 
'Vaters. Defendant testified that his mother stated in thP 
presence of Mr. 'V ate rs that she was happy she could 
do this (execute the deeds) in return for what dt>fendant 
had done for her (R. 400). She also stated at that 
time that defendant had more than paid for the property 
(R. 406). 
Undue influence is refuted by the evidence of J. B. 
Walker. He testified that the mother told him that sh~ 
was going to see that Austin got the property (R. 349) 
and that it was her intention that Austin have the 
property because of the care that lw and his family 
had given ( R. 351). 
After the deeds had been made over to Austin, she 
told J. B. that she had done so ( R. 355). If Austin had 
used undue influence to get the deeds, it is quite unlikely 
that Mother \Valker would have told J. B. some nine 
years prior thereto of her intention to deed the properry· 
to him, and, after the deeds were made, advise J.B. that 
she had done so. 
Mother Walker was able to resist the persuasion 
of others for she told J.B. that she had come home 
from Nevada in order to avoid the pressure which was 
put upon her by the folks in K evada to dred her property 
to them (R. 353). This circumstance might be a clue to 
this case for it is a common trait of human nature for 
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a person to aecuse another of the evil which he himself 
possesses. lf plaintiffs attempted to persuade Mother 
\\'alker to convey her property to them, it is not surpris-
ing that tlH'Y should accuse Austin of the same evil 
doings. lf tlierP is a suspicion of evil doing by Austin, 
it is in tlH' minds of the plantiffs and not in the evidence. 
At the close of the evidence the trial court gave 
l1is irnpression tlwn•of. Among other things he stated, 
"I think truth hasn't been rampant around 
ht•re. Let me put it that way first. I think there 
has Leen somebody's conscience seared a lot here, 
but it doesn't seem to faze them much, and so I 
have to pick what I think is the truth." (R. 480, 
±81) 
"I believe J.B. has done a lot for this family." 
(R. -!81) 
''I think that Austin Walker was young 
enough to kind of get caught in the snare and 
stay home, and the fell ow that stays home gener-
ally has the rough end of keeping things to-
gether." (R. 481) 
"I think the testimony of a man who teaches 
school, who's been a bishop in his church, should 
be given a little more weight than the other wit-
nesses have where his testimony is competent .. 
I would be inclined to think that maybe he may 
be telling me the truth here in places." (R. 481, 
482). 
"The testimony of J.B.'s wife, Mary or Mari-
lyn - I have forgotten her name - something 
like that - and J.B. leads me to believe that 
Mother just wasn't being imposed on here insofar 
as that property is concerned, and I would think 
the property in pink ought to go to Austin as 
his own." (R. 482) 
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Th: latt•r findings of confidential rPlatiomship and 
undue mfluPnCP arP obviouslY n•1rn<TJ1ant a11 -1 • t • I'°' u con ra. 
dictorv to the Court's own Pvalnation of thP '"·i·d 
• '. l'Il('~. 
Although tlw Court made no finding [!S to th1, ark. 
quacy of consi<h•ration in thP transfers from ~finn1>tta 
w· alker to hee SOn, tlwn• can hP no qUPStion that theri· 
is suffieient consideration hy !'Pason of Ap1wllant'~ ear-
ing for the property and his Sl'tTices to his motlwr owr 
the years. 
In the case of Randall 1:. Tracy Cullins Tm.st Com-
pany, G r. 2d 18, 305 P. 2d -1-80, tlw court was concerned 
with a situation wlwn~ the Plaintiff lt>ft his lmsines:; and 
home in Ogden and moved to Provo, lTtah, which to. 
gether with services rPndt~red for tht> decendPnt was held 
to be adequate consideration for an agrepnwnt to eonwy 
real property. 
In the case of Gil1lJ011s v. Brimm, 119 F. G21, 230 P. 
2d 983, an action was brought to spt aside a conveyanc~ 
of property to the DPfendant which was made in return 
for Defendant's promisP to provide Plaintiff with a home, 
support and care upon the ground that Plaintiff was so 
infirm of body and mind "that her will was overcome to 
the extent that the execution and delivery of the docu-
ments were not her voluntary acts." The Defendant 
grantee in that case was a niece ·who had been the objl'ft 
of special affection from the Plaintiff. The Grantor w~ 
75 years of age, in ill health, and desired to have the Df· 
fendant come to live with her, care for her and run th~ 
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farm. Comuu•nts of the Court are particularly pertinent 
to the facts in the instant matter, which we quote: 
"The plaintiff apparently set out to make two 
lllain contentions in seeking to avoid the effects of 
tht• dl·Pd, bill of sale and assignment. (1) That 
shP was so infirm of body and mind that her will 
\rns oYPf<'OllH' to the extent that the execution and 
dPlivery of the documents were not her voluntary 
ads; and ( :2) that the defendants breached the 
agrel'lllPnt to provide her a home and care, \Vhich 
Pntitles her to rescission. The burden of proving 
th<'~W contentions was upon the plaintiff." 
··Without delint>ating them, we observe that the 
('YidPm·e reveals some discrepancies in plaintiff's 
tPstimony concerning the ownership and disposi-
tion of pt>rsonal property which may have given 
rise to some skepticism on the part of the trial 
eourt with respect to plaintiff's frankness, or per-
haps better stated, her lack of memory and under-
standing of details due to her infirmity and ad-
vanct>d age. 
''The plaintiff made some effort in the evi-
dt•nee to support her first point that the execution 
of the conveyances were not voluntary. The se-
<tUPnce of events themselves, without more, would 
bP sufficient refutation of this contention. But 
takPn together with other evidence there is ample 
to warrant the court in refusing to believe that 
plaintiff had met her burden of proof that she did 
not intend the coveyances." 
8eP abo: Desert Centers, Inc. v. Glen Canyon Inc., 
11 U. 2d 166, 356 P. 2d 286. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN IT8 RCLING ON 
THE "DEAD MAX'S STATUTE'' BY PRE-
CL"CDING DEFE~DANT AND HIS WIFE 
FROM TESTIFYING \VITH RESPECT TO 
MATTERS PERTAINING TO lTNDUE I~­
FLUENCE. 
Under Point I it was urged that thc> evidence doe~ 
not support the finding of undue influencf>. Althoui;h 
not admitting the sufficiency of tht~ evidence, it is thP 
contention of defendant that by offering evidence of 
undue influPnce plaintiffs waived the incompetency cre-
ated by the "dead man's statute" with respcet therPto. 
The rule adopted by this court is that ''under 'dead man's 
statute' (Sec. 78-24-2 U.C.A. 1953) a witness whose inter-
est is adverse to that of the estate of deceased may 
testify concerning matters equally within knowledge of 
deceased and witness, where representative has put in 
testimony as to those matters"" 0 ." Burk v. Peter 113 
Utah 58, 202 P. 2d 543, Startin v. Madsen 120 F 631, 
237 p. 2d 834. 
Defendant offered to testify to conversations with 
his mother concerning her motive in making the deeds but 
was prevented from doing so by the ruling of the court 
on the "dead man's statute" (R. 404, 405, 406.) De· 
fendant offered a schedule, Exhibit D-13, showing crops 
he had produced on the farm year by year for a period 
of over 20 years (R. 409). The court refused to admit 
the exhibit (R. 412). Defendant also offered to testi~· 
to improvements he had made on the farm over the 
years (R. 415) but was not permitted to do so by the 
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ruling of the court on the dead man's statute (R. 416) . 
.\lotivP of tlw mother in making the deeds, crops pro-
duced by defendant on property in question, and im-
prownwnts made thereon by defendant, tend to refute 
nn<ltw influPn<'(:'. The court erred in failing to admit 
~urh evjdence. 
POINT III 
TUE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
A COXFIDK~'"'l'IAL RELATIONSHIP EX-
ISTED BET,VEEN DEFENDANT AND HIS 
SISTJ.~R ILA AND IN DENYING COMPEN-
SATIOX TO DEFENDANT FOR HIS SERV-
ICES AS TRVSTEE. 
Tlw court found defendant had received property 
from his sister Ila upon an oral trust (R. 48) and 
ordered him to account therefor. (R. 43). The court 
also found there was a confidential relationship between 
drf Pndant and his sister (R. 48). 
l<\Jr the same reasons as set forth in Point I, it 
is urged that the evidence does not support the finding 
of a confidential relationship between defendant and his 
sister Ila. Had defendant attempted to impose upon 
his sister or take advantage of her why should he admit 
lw held the property in trust. Defendant acknowledged 
thP trust in his answer (R. 8). His position was stated 
in the pretrial order ( R. 17). Defendant claims to have 
ust><l funds of his own to defray the expenses for which 
thr property of his sister was to be used and that the 
expenses which he paid exceeded in value the property 
rrri\'"t>d from Ila (R. 9). Defendant has never claimed 
as his own the residue of the property, if any, after 
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the e~penses were paid. It may he urgPd that defendant 
was m error in using his own funds for payment of 
expenses and attempting to off :,wt sueh against the valu~ 
of the Ila property. If it is propc>r that he should account 
for the Ila propPrty arnl lw rPimhurs<><l for moneys ad-
vanced from his own funds, the fad n•rnains that he 
does not and nevPr has clairn<>d tlw n•sidue, if any. a~ 
his property. 
The facts, as al)Ove sc>t forth, should refute th,, 
finding of confidf~ntial relationship. Even more signifi. ' 
cant than the lack of evidence to support tlw findin!! 
is the lack of necessity for the finding at all. Had 
defendant denied the trust plaintiffs would have hPen 
justified in attempting to prove confidPntial relationship. 
Admission of the trust hv the def Pndant obviatPd anY . . 
necessity for the finding of confidt>ntial relationship. 
Inasmuch as the finding of confidential relationship i~ 
unnecessary to support the trust it appears the only 
purpose therefor is an attempt to justify disallowanc~ 
of compensation to defendant for his services in carin~ , 
for the property of his sister. If an accounting show~ 
disposition of the prorwrty in accordance with the tru8t. 
the claim of the defendant, as set forth in thP pretrial , 
order ( R. 19) for the compensation for his servicPs, IL\ 
trustee, is well founded. 
POIXT IV 
·THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT ALTERNATIVE RELIEF BY 
\VAY OF A LIEN ON THE PROPERTY 
ACQUIRED FROM HIS MOTHER FOR IM-
PROVEMENTS AND TAXES PAID. 
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If tlw <·ourt <k•tennines that the deeds from de-
frndan t '~ motlwr WPre not obtained by undue influence, 
1lt>frndant 's elaim of a lien by way of alternative relief 
ht•collll'S moot. In any evPnt, discussion here should 
not lw <·onstnwd by way of detraction from the firm 
<·on\·idion of <lPfl:'ndant that the finding of undue in-
f!m·rn·e should be rPversed. 
Till• maxim, "He who seeks equity must to equity" 
ltas long IH•Pn recognizPd by this court. See Commercial 
!Ja11k r. I' age and Bri1iton, 45 Utah 14, 142 P. 709; 
lla11r·ock 1·. Luke, 52 rtah 142, 173 P. 137; Rosenthyne v. 
J!attl1ew-J/c( 'ullough, 51 l'Ttah 38, 168 P. 957; Glenn 
1. Play<'r, 7 Ctah 2d -128, 326 P. 2d 717. 
Plaintiffs have been content to sit by and allow 
<!t·frndant to takP care of the farm for over forty years, 
pay taxes then•on and improve the same and make 
the produce tlwrefrom available for members of the 
family who were at home and, particularly, to provide 
for an income for the mother. But when the economic 
C'omplexion of the property changed from a farm value 
nf some $:200.00 per acre to a subdivision value of $5,-
000.00 an acre, plaintiffs suddenly become interested 
and seek the equitable power of the court to deprive de-
fendant of his title thereto. (J.B.W. 295-298) 
The property was saved from tax sale by defendant. 
Dt>tail as to the taxes paid by defendant is set forth 
in tlw Statement of Facts. Defendant farmed the prop-
Prty for some -10 years for the benefit of the family (R. 
1-J.:2, 288, 289 and 230). Plaintiffs will probably contend 
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that the farming operation was of economic benefit to 
defendant. This appears to he a fallacy in view of th" 
fact that there were some years when ~[other Walker 
rented the property on shares but the lessees apparentlv 
did not think it worthwhile to continue through the ve · . ar 
so they walked away and left Austin to salvage such 
crop as ht> could for the benefit of the family. (R. 289i. 
The fact is that defendant operated tht> farm for thl:' 
benefit of the family. 
If deft>ndant is to be deprived of the property, tlw 
court should avoid unjust enrichment to plaintiffs and 
invoke the e<1uitable maxim referred to above by charg-
ing the property with a lien in favor of defendant for 
ta..xes paid and services rendered by him. 
POINTY 
THE COURT ERRI~D IN DEXYIXG DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant filed a motion for new trial upon tht 
grounds, among other things, of newly discovered en-
dence (R. 50). Affidavits of defendant, Glenn C. Schmid! 
and Ray Smith were filed in support thereof (R. 52-57). 
The affidavit of Ray Smith states that he had been 
acquainted with Minnetta Walker for some years prior 
· to her death; that in approximately the year l 948 hP 
had conversations with Minnetta \Valker with respect 
to purchasing an acre of ground, at which time she 
stated she would sell an acre of ground to him but that 
she intended to convey the remainder of her property 
to her son, Austin \Valker, for the purpose of compen· 
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~ating him for st>rv1ces performed and improvements 
made on ht>r property. In his affidavit Glenn C. Schmidt 
;-;tat\'~ that lw i8 a real estate broker residing in Salt 
LakP County, l~tah; that in approximately the years 1948 
and 19-t~ lH• approached Minnetta \V alker for the pur-
po,.w of purchasing a building lot from her, at which 
tiuw ~ht• advised him that she was negotiating with Ray 
~mith for the Hale of an acre of ground and that she 
intPnd~ to keep the remainder of her property for the 
pnrpos<' of convt>ying the same to her son, Austin Walker, 
and that she wanted to reserve it for her son, Austin, 
to iwrmit him to place a supermarket on the property 
if he so desired. The affidavit of Austin Walker states 
that sine!:' the trial of the cause he talked with Rex Cole 
on tlw telephone who advised defendant that in about 
tlw year 1950 he had had conversations with Minnetta 
\Y alker in which she had told him that she intended 
to give her property to her son Austin for the reason 
that he had made improvements thereon and had per-
formed services for her and her family. 
To warrant granting a new trial on newly discovered 
eYi<lence this court, in the very recent case of Universal 
lnastment Co. i:. Carpets, Incorporated,·----·-- Utah ........ , 
+OO P. 2d 564, 567, has stated that the moving party 
must meet these requirements: 
''there must be material, competent evidence which 
is in fact 'newly discovered;' which by due dili-
g<'nce could not have been discovered and pro-
ducPd at the trial; and it must not be merely 
cumulative or incidental, but it must be of suffi-
cifnt substance that there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that with it there would have been a different 
result. ••• ,, 
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In Jensen v. Logan City, 89 l'tah 3-17, 57 P. ~'l iOS 
this court held the trial court had abused its discrf'tio~ 
in denying a motion for new trial hased upon nt•\ih 
discoverPd evidence. Tlw court statPd on pagp 7~3: · 
"\YherP disintert>sted tPstimony on the Yitai 
point in a easP is v<>ry s<'ant, newly <lis<·owr\•<l 
te::-;fonony on that point ap1waring frolll affid1n-ib 
in support of tlw motion for a nPw trial to he 
appan,ntly n'liahlP, wh<'n it ap1wars that tlw 
movant for the new trial was not guilty of 
indiligence in failing to obtain the wi tnes; for 
the trial, and that there is no element of 
holding such witness in reserve for purposes 
of obtaining a new trial - generally pictur-
esquely denominated in slang phraseolo~y as 
'an ace in the hole' - and it appears likel1 
that such evidence would change tlw result, a nP,;. 
trial should be granted. -While the granting or 
refusing of thP motion lies in the sound <fowrl'tion 
of the court, wherp there is graVl' suspicion that 
justieP ma~· have miscarried becamw of tlw laek 
of Pnlightllwnt on a vital point whiC'h nPw Pvi-
<l<->nC'e will apparently supply, and tlw othPr Plt>-
mPnts att<'ndant on obtaining a n('W trial on tlw 
ground of 1w\\·ly disC'oYered <'vidPnCl' an' prt>:'Pnt. 
it would hP an alnuw of sound discn,tion not to 
grant th<-> same.***" 
The foregoing rnk• is also followed in 8tate r. Dunca11. 
10:2 rtah +l9, 13:2 P. 2d 12-1-. 
The casP at bar meets the n><:1uirements set forth 
above. 
A vital point in this case is the court's finding of 
undue inflrn'nCP. Howev<->r, as lH•rt>inabove pointed out, 
undue influence was not framed as an issue in the pre· 
trial Order. 'rlwn•fore, Ap1wllant could not have an· 
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ticipah·d that it would later be the basis upon which 
tlw trial <·ourt would set aside the transfers. The fact 
that d(•frndant's mother, several years before the con-
'; ya1H·es ,,·pn• made, disclos<>d to three disinterested 
!l!'J'Sl)Jl:' lt(•J' intent to convey her property to her son, 
.\nstin. sl1ould hav<' a mat<>rial bearing upon the question 
of uJ1dt1t• influ<'nc'l'. Such evidence is of sufficient sub-
~1a11"(' that \\·ith it tlwre is a reasonable likelihood that 
11 11 • rt>:.:ult wuuld have been different. 
Th(• l'Vid<>nc<> was newly discovered. In his affidavit, 
<h·frndant stat<>s that he had no knowledge of such evi-
de1we until after the trial. The evidence could not, by 
dnP diligen<·t>, have been discovered and produced at the 
trial sin<'e tht> mattPr was not an issue in the case. The 
affidavit of defendant in support of the motion states 
that ht• contacted Hay Smith in the summer of 1964 
in pn•paration for the trial and was advised that Smith 
liad 1wgotiat<>d ,,·ith defendant's mother for the purchase 
of an acre of land, but defendant did not know until 
aftPr tlw trial that his mother had stated to Smith that 
:.:hP wanted him, the defendant, to have her property. 
1.R. .)~). Tlw affidavit of Ray Smith states that he did 
not inform defendant of such statement until January 
1965. Defendant's affidavit states that he attempted to 
lo('at1' RPx Cole in the summer of 1964. He made inquiry 
of relative:.; of Rex Cole and attempted to correspond 
with him hut was unable to locate him so that he might 
hP a witness at the time of the trial (R. 53). Defendant 
had no know ledge prior to January 1965, after the trial, 
nf thP fart that Glenn Schmidt had negotiated with de-
f Pndant's mother for purchase of land and that she had 
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told him that she intended to keep the property d . an 
give it to her son, Austin (R. 57). 
The evidence is not merely cumulative but relat{'s 
to a matter injected into the case at the trial without 
defendant having had an opportunity to prepare to meet 
such issue. Dale \Vaters, the bank officer, testified to thP 
execution of the deeds but could not recall any of the 
conversation (R. 318). Defendant and J. B. Walker 
testified to statements made by their mother regarding 
the conveyance of the property to defendant. It is dif-
ficult to justify the court's finding in light of such evi-
dence unless he considered the interest of the witnessf',. 
If such is true, the testimony of three disinterested per-
sons is not cumulative and is vital to the issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The principal object of this appeal is to obtain a 
reversal of the trial court's finding of undue influence. 
The record shows the defendant operated the family 
farm all of his adult life and lived in close proximity 
of his mother and had almost daily contact with her. 
If such circumstances provide opportunity for the exer-
cise of undue influence, they fall far short of anythin~ 
suggesting actual domination and exertion of influence. 
In view of the deficiency in the evidence, as express-
ed in Point I, it is a deplorable thing, aside from tht 
economic consequences involved, for the court to have 
branded a wholesome relationship of parent and child 
with the stigma of a confidential relationship as such IB 
known in the law. This court is therefore strongly urged 
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to correct the error of the trial court and reverse the 
finding of undue influence. It is hoped that such will 
bP accomplished by this appeal. 
It has bPen emphasized in Point III that not only 
wru; there lack of evidence to sustain the finding of a 
r,onfidential relationship between def end ant and his sis-
tt>r but there was no necessity for such finding at all. 
Thi~ 1•rror should also be corrected. Defendant should be 
n'quirt>d to account for his sister's property and should 
lw allowed compensation for his services in the handling 
thNeof. 
The record is such that the errors of the trial court 
lihould be corrected without the necessity of a new trial. 
If for any reason the court is not of such an opinion, 
it has been pointed out that ground for a new trial exists 
and such should be granted. It is hoped that relief can 
IJe afforded and justice done on behalf of defendant 
without the rewashing of the family linen for a period 
of some 40 years in a new trial. Finally, if all else fails, 
defendant should not be deprived of relief. Equity re-
quires that its principles be invoked by impressing the 
proprrty with a lien in favor of defendant as suggested 
in Point IV. 
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